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Managing for results can be a treacherous tightrope walk for school districts. The popular adage calling 
for a combination of “pressure and support” remains easier said than done.
2 When schools are failing 
children, the natural impulse is to ratchet up accountability, adopt a “no excuses” policy of one kind or 
another, and increase the pressure on those closest to the students —principals and teachers. However, 
like most performance appraisal systems, if implemented in isolation this approach runs the risk of 
crowding out capacity-building just when it is needed most. Indeed, the schools that are penalized for 
low performance are often the ones staffed with the educators most in need of development. Though 
some schools might have a critical mass of staff who simply do not believe improvements in their 
practice would have an effect on student learning and therefore resist accountability, most reformers 
operate on the assumption that the vast majority of educators are motivated to serve their students 
well. As one long-time urban superintendent says, “If low-performing schools knew how to fix 
themselves, they would do it.”
3 This implies that simply adding more pressure on schools without a 
concurrent effort to increase capacity runs the risk of undermining the ultimate goal of improving 
performance; with low self-efficacy or a lack of confidence in their ability to successfully adopt new 
approaches, principals’ and teachers’ prospects of improving their students’ learning may be hindered. 
At worst, these professionals might engage in undesirable strategic behaviors that undermine learning.
4 
How then can school districts walk the high wire in service of improving results for all children? The New 
York City Department of Education (DOE) has an approach that has sparked interest from policy-makers, 
practitioners, and researchers worldwide. This paper attempts to describe this approach. We begin by 
describing the history behind the DOE’s evolving theory of action for how to improve student 
performance at scale. We include a summary of their efforts to, as Chancellor Joel Klein often said, 
“change the facts on the ground” to support implementation of the theory between 2002 and 2009. To 
do this, we cover some of the ground in Paul Hill’s chapter in this volume, but focus more specifically on 
the strategic and structural choices that are relevant to the performance management system. As we 
will show, the perspective that the DOE took on performance management was unique at the time: 
rather than granting autonomy as a reward when schools achieve high performance, the DOE granted 
schools autonomy outright in return for high levels of accountability.  
Following this historical overview, we offer a brief summary of research on “organizational learning,” an 
idea that is reflected in the ways in which the DOE attempted to build capacity in schools. Next, building 
on this historical and theoretical backdrop, we describe the details of the DOE’s performance 
management system and the ways in which schools have been held accountable while at the same time 
being provided with a variety of supports to do their work. Here, our chapter complements others in this 
volume, including Joan Talbert’s examination of inquiry teams, an organizational learning mechanism 
that has become central to the DOE’s reform efforts. Finally, we offer insight from some exploratory 
analyses we performed based on a large-scale survey of New York City teachers to investigate the DOE’s 
theory of performance management in action. Here, we investigate teacher perceptions of school 
culture along the dimensions of accountability and organizational learning and explore whether and 
how these aspects of a school’s culture relate to school performance. Suggestions for future research 
and implications for practice conclude our paper. 
NEW YORK’S THEORY OF ACTION AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
5 
Between 2002 and 2009, Chancellor Joel Klein and his team implemented an evolving theory of action at 
the DOE based largely on the premise that if given autonomy for decisions about resources and 
instruction, school principals would improve the performance of their students more effectively than if 
those decisions were made for them at the central office. In exchange for this autonomy, principals and CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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their schools would be held more accountable for results than in previous administrations. Klein’s theory 
development was heavily influenced by the work of scholars and thought leaders such as William Ouchi, 
Paul Hill, and Michael Barber, as well as by his observations of a number of high-performing charter 
schools in the city.
6  
In order to put their theory into practice, Klein and his team implemented a two-phased strategy. In the 
first phase (roughly 2003–2006), the team sought to consolidate control by moving the oversight of New 
York’s approximately 1,300 schools from 32 separately governed and managed community districts and 
a high school division to 10 K-12 regions, a special education district, and a district for alternative 
schools and programs (for a total of 12 entities), all reporting to the chancellor and governed by Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg. These new structures were designed to support schools’ operational and 
instructional needs, enforce standards, and implement reforms. Dubbed Children First, this first phase 
also instituted a common math and literacy curriculum for grades K–8, ended social promotion, created 
150 small schools to replace large low-performing high schools, and added a parent coordinator and 
math and literacy coaches to every elementary school. Reflecting on this phase in 2007, Klein said the 
purpose was to gain control of a “chaotic and dysfunctional organizational structure” and to “lock the 
system down, establish some control, and bring coherence to the system.” Required curriculum, 
standardized promotion policies, and a more centralized reporting structure seem incongruous with a 
theory of action premised on greater autonomy. Klein and his team have argued that in order to 
eventually put more control in the hands of school leaders they had to first disrupt the entrenched 
bases of power in the 32 community districts, and transferring those districts’ authority to the new 
regions was one way to accomplish this.  
After the first two years of Children First, Klein and the senior team began laying the groundwork for 
phase two, which would eventually turn the system on its head by moving power from the 12 entities to 
the leaders of nearly 1,300 schools.
7 Klein believed that empowering highly competent principals and 
giving them the resources needed to make decisions about solving their schools’ performance problems 
would ultimately be in the best interest of students. In order for empowerment to be effective, Klein 
also believed that principals needed to be held accountable for student performance. Klein described his 
theory of action for phase two, saying:  
If we empower principals and hold them accountable for school results, we’ll do two things—shift 
the locus of power from central office to the schools and shift the organizational culture to a focus 
on results. However, I know that autonomy in and of itself is not going to guarantee success. But it 
will lead to innovation. And I suspect that if we’re tight on accountability and instill an intense focus 
on student outcomes, we can also build into the equation some variability in terms of problem 
solving at the school level and learn from it. 
The first wave of phase two was a pilot called the “autonomy zone,” which school leaders could opt into 
by signing performance contracts in exchange for freedom from many of the mandates of the Children 
First reforms, including their reporting relationship to a regional superintendent and the district-wide 
math and reading curriculum. Other large urban districts, including Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia, 
were experimenting with such zones, but in those cities, schools earned autonomy by meeting 
performance thresholds. In New York, the senior team developed a fundamentally different assumption: 
autonomy was not something to be earned by performing well; rather, it was a prerequisite for high 
performance. Any school leader could choose to participate in the autonomy zone (the Zone), regardless 
of the school’s current performance.  CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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Twenty-nine schools volunteered to join the Zone, more than half of which had recently launched as 
new small schools. Each principal signed a five-year performance contract that specified targets for a 
variety of indicators, including state test scores, attendance figures, and graduation rates. As part of the 
agreement, principals assumed control over all budgetary and decision-making authority that previously 
resided with regional offices. Zone schools that met their performance targets were left alone, while 
those that missed more than a certain number of targets entered into what the DOE called the “ladder 
of consequences.” The timeline for these consequences was more aggressive than those in No Child Left 
Behind or the New York state accountability system. The first year a school missed its targets, the 
school’s leadership team was required to develop specific action plans for the following year. If a school 
missed its performance goals for a second year, the principal could be removed. If things did not 
improve by the third year, the school could be closed. The principals answered to the Zone chief 
executive officer, Eric Nadelstern, who was responsible for all Zone schools and worked directly with 
those who failed to meet their targets. At the beginning of the second year, 19 additional schools joined 
the Zone. At the end of the second year, 2 of the 48 Zone schools failed to meet their performance 
goals. In fall of 2006 the number of schools in the renamed “empowerment zone” grew to 332. Klein 
heralded the increasing interest in the autonomy/accountability exchange as a shift in the fundamental 
culture of the school system, saying, 
I think if you don’t change the culture of public education, you’re not going to change the outcomes 
materially. A culture that doesn’t focus on performance is a culture that won’t work. And now these 
principals are saying they want to be held accountable for their performance. It’s quite a thing to 
have [332] principals, over the objection of their union, sign performance agreements saying, ‘If I 
don’t hit the ball, they’ll be sending me to the minors.’ It’s a big, big deal given the objections from 
the union and the good relationships many of these principals have with their regions. 
Building on what they learned in the pilot, the senior team unveiled a new three-pronged organizational 
structure that went into effect in fall 2007. The special education district remained intact, but the 
regions were disbanded and every school leader was given the choice to affiliate with one of three types 
of school support organizations (SSOs):  
1.  Empowerment Support Organization (ESO): The empowerment zone converted into the ESO, 
and additional schools could become empowerment schools by signing performance contracts 
and forming self-managed networks. 
2.  Learning Support Organizations (LSOs): Most similar to the old regional structure but not 
organized geographically, four learning support organizations offered schools service, support, 
and oversight through four centers run by the DOE.  
3.  Partnership Support Organizations (PSOs): Schools that partnered with external nonprofit 
organizations for support and services were part of this structure and signed performance 
contracts. A number of schools were already partnered with external organizations, and the new 
structure would formally give those organizations additional support responsibilities, hold them 
accountable for school results, and open up the option to additional schools and nonprofits. 
PSOs had the same level of autonomy granted to the school operators in the ESO. 
The autonomy/accountability exchange was at work regardless of which support organization school 
leaders chose. Though the ESO included the most freedoms, principals’ choices about which support 
organization to affiliate with were framed as acts of autonomy, and regardless of which choice they 
made, every principal signed a five-year performance contract. Principals also had the option to transfer CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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to another support organization during an open enrollment period every two years. Klein’s team 
believed this new level of autonomy would attract new people to school leadership positions who would 
be more likely to innovate.  
As part of the autonomy equation, Klein and Bloomberg negotiated mutual consent hiring with the 
United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the largest local bargaining unit in the United States. Prior to this 
agreement, tenured teachers were able to choose which schools they worked in regardless of whether a 
school’s principal agreed to the transfer. If no openings existed in the desired school, a senior teacher 
could “bump” a non-tenured teacher out of the school to create a slot. Under mutual consent, principals 
became responsible for hiring their teaching staffs and “bumping rights” were eliminated. Klein 
considered this change a pillar of the autonomy/accountability exchange—if principals were to be held 
accountable for the commitments they made in their performance contracts, they needed the flexibility 
to build school teams they felt best positioned them for success.  
In order to make the autonomy/accountability exchange work at scale, a set of coherent systems and 
structures were necessary to capture the benefits of principal autonomy and at the same time exploit 
the advantages of being a large, integrated system. The next section describes some of the key 
accountability and organizational learning mechanisms that together make up the performance 
management system in New York City. 
DESIGNING A PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM   
Jim Liebman had been a respected civil rights attorney, legal scholar, and teacher at Columbia Law 
School before joining the DOE in 2005 as the chief accountability officer. Klein recruited him with a 
mandate to lead the design and implementation of a performance management system. Liebman often 
described the performance management system his team created as an attempt to strike the right 
balance between instilling accountability for past results and encouraging continuous improvement 
toward future outcomes. A key goal of the system was to help schools develop into organizations in 
which professionals were constantly learning with one another about how to solve performance 
problems. Liebman described his thinking this way:  
Accountability isn’t entirely or even mainly about incentives. It’s about capacity building, which to 
me means adult learning based on self and team evaluation of what’s working and what’s not, and 
knowledge management, meaning spreading what works from one student or school to another. If 
we want the lever of accountability to be as powerful as possible, we have to provide ways for 
schools to build their capacity to be relatively self-sufficient in evaluating themselves every day and 
in solving their unique performance problems and, when necessary, in asking for the specific help 
they need. This will never work if the central bureaucracy behaves as if it has all the answers. Our 
role is to help professionals in schools ask better questions so that they can craft customized 
answers based on their own evaluation of their performance problems. 
Organizational Learning and Accountability: A Theoretical Backdrop 
The DOE’s approach to capacity-building is consistent with relatively new approaches to school reform 
that include the idea of organizational learning. Rather than providing training to implement a specific 
curriculum or instructional technique, the DOE focused on increasing school teams’ capacity to learn 
from data and adjust their behavior based on this learning. “Organizational learning” refers to a 
collective or a more macro-level learning than that which occurs at the individual level.
8 There are many 
excellent reviews of the organizational learning literature and its application to the context of education, CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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including a recent 2008 special issue on organizational learning in the American Journal of Education.
9 
Rather than provide yet another review, we offer instead a very brief overview of the literature, 
highlighting specific aspects of this work that are present in the design of the DOE’s performance 
management system.  
In general, we note that despite the espoused merits of bringing organizational learning theory to the 
field of education, many education scholars concur that empirical evidence in this arena is lacking and 
that explicit approaches to building capacity for organizational learning in schools remain in their 
infancy. One reason that this has remained an elusive phenomenon may be that the concept of 
organizational learning has become burdened with multiple interpretations. The term “organizational 
learning” was originally introduced by March and Simon in 1958.
10 Their research, along with that of 
their doctoral students, focused primarily on the cognitive processes of information search, acquisition, 
integration, and assimilation. Much of this work was on private sector organizations, and centered on 
how knowledge and information could be resources to help organizations “learn” and thereby improve 
performance.
11  
In contrast, a second approach to organizational learning has emerged over the years that scholars such 
as Meredith Honig describe as “sociocultural learning theory.”
12 Here, rather than emphasize the 
rational, cognitive processes that govern information management and complex problem-solving, the 
focus has been on how individuals co-construct meaning with those around them. From this vantage 
point, learning cannot be considered without a close examination of the social embeddedness of 
individuals in organizations. This research stream has focused on how individuals learn through 
interactions with others in practice and on the social processes of learning.
13;14  
Recently, education scholars have called for greater integration between these two perspectives on 
organizational learning.
15 Research in the adjacent field of organizational behavior has adopted a 
perspective that takes such an integrative stance. In 2008, Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino introduced 
several “building blocks” that they argue are critical to organizational learning: a supportive learning 
environment in which individuals feel “psychologically safe”
 to speak up and ask for help; concrete 
learning processes and practices that enable the collection, analysis, and transfer of valuable 
information; and leadership that reinforces learning by supporting those closest to the organization’s 
core work.
16;17;18 Although much of these scholars’ work has focused on healthcare and other industries, 
the conceptual underpinnings of their research and the integrative stance they take has caught the 
attention of reformers such as Liebman.  
Today, many scholars and practitioners, like Liebman, view organizational learning as one side of a 
productive tension. The other side is accountability. Since the advent of standards-based reform in the 
1990s, scholars have been writing about its implications for accountability. This research stream has 
definitional and interpretation challenges similar to the organizational learning literature cited above. 
Jennifer O’Day’s work draws a distinction between bureaucratic and professional accountability that 
helps to distinguish between the often top-down pressure an organizational system puts on educators 
and the mutual responsibility educators have to one another to live up to the quality standards of their 
profession.
19 Richard Elmore categorizes the different dynamics as internal accountability, the shared 
expectations for teaching and learning and a means to meet these expectations; and external 
accountability, a system for holding people responsible for producing certain results.
20 Elmore also 
writes about the notion of reciprocal accountability, which he sums up in the following statement: “For 
every unit of performance I demand of you, I have an equal responsibility to provide you with a unit of 
capacity, if the performance I require of you requires knowledge and skill that you do not possess.”
21  CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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Bringing multiple research streams together, organizational behavior scholar Amy Edmondson recently 
proposed that work environments characterized by high levels of organizational learning as well as high 
levels of accountability enable superior performance.
22 This proposition has yet to be empirically tested. 
Still, it echoes the present-day thesis among education leaders that it is important to balance “support 
and pressure” in order to reach high performance in schools and district-wide. When communicating the 
DOE’s performance management tools to internal and external audiences in the early days of 
implementation, Liebman would often quote Elmore’s reciprocal accountability concept, and the 
particular form of capacity he emphasized was the ability of school teams to learn together how to solve 
their performance challenges. This framing is consistent with Edmondson’s proposition that high levels 
of both accountability for results and organizational learning will lead to higher performance than the 
presence of only one or the other. 
IMPLEMENTING SYSTEMS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Consistent with the theoretical frame described in the previous section, Liebman and his team in the 
Office of Accountability developed learning tools and processes to help schools build their capacity to 
problem-solve and self-evaluate, even as they ratcheted up the accountability pressure for results. The 
organizational learning and accountability tools together formed a performance management system 
with a number of key components, including school progress reports, quality reviews, periodic 
assessments, inquiry teams, and a new technology system.  
In this section, we focus specifically on the design, implementation, and evolution of progress reports as 
an accountability tool and quality reviews as an organizational learning tool, as well as some of the 
interactions between them. Other chapters in this volume discuss other aspects of the performance 
management system (see, for example, Joan Talbert’s chapter on inquiry teams). We primarily cover the 
first three school years of implementation (2007, 2008, and 2009) and only refer to changes 
implemented in the 2010 school year when they are useful in illuminating challenges encountered in the 
preceding years.  
Progress Reports 
The Office of Accountability created a progress report to evaluate and communicate school performance 
internally and externally. The reports were designed to provide a historical account of a school’s overall 
success in improving student academic outcomes. Progress reports for all schools included four main 
subsections, each with different weights that would add up to 100 points to determine a school’s overall 
letter grade, as discussed in more detail below.  
To account for differences in curriculum and targets by grade level, two versions of the report were 
created, one for elementary and middle schools and another for high schools. In 2006–2007, letter 
grades were assigned based on how schools performed relative to one another on the 100 point scale: 
The top 15% received As, the next 40% received Bs, the next 30% received Cs, the next 10% received Ds, 
and the bottom 5% received Fs. After a baseline was established the first year, each September the DOE 
published the cut scores that would correspond to letter grades on the progress reports at the end of 
the year.  
The cut score for various grades increased a few points each year in order to continuously raise the bar 
for system-wide performance. The goal was to push out the performance horizon so that schools with 
good letter grades had incentives for continuous improvement.  CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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The following sections describe the four basic subsections of the progress reports: school environment, 
school performance, school progress, and additional credit; and how they are calculated to produce a 
score on the 100-point scale and a letter grade. 
School environment 
The school environment section evaluated schools based on attendance figures and survey data from 
parents, teachers, and students in 6th through 12th grades. The 15% weight for this subsection was the 
sum of 5% for attendance and 10% for the survey results. The surveys covered four areas, each of which 
contributed equally to the 10% weight: safety and respect, academic expectations, engagement, and 
communication. Liebman’s team designed the surveys but a vendor delivered them, collected the data, 
and provided anonymous results back to the DOE. Administering approximately 1.5 million surveys 
posed significant implementation challenges, but from the first year the response rates were large 
enough to allow for reliable data, and the response rates grew each year, as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Environment survey response rates 
  2007  2008  2009 
Teachers  44%  61%  73% 
Students (6–12)  65%  78%  80% 
Parents  26%  40%  45% 
Source: Author analysis of publicly available progress report results for 2007, 2008, and 2009.
23  
Student performance 
The student performance section graded the school based on the percentage of students scoring at level 
3 or 4 on that year’s state mathematics and English-language arts exams. On the high school progress 
report, this section scored performance on Regents exams and graduation. In 2007, this subsection was 
worth 30% of the total score, and was reduced to 25% in subsequent years. 
Student progress 
To distinguish the new progress reports from previous accountability reports distributed by the city and 
state, the DOE emphasized individual student growth from one year to the next much more than the 
average absolute performance of a school’s students at a point in time. This section started with a 
weight of 55% and increased to 60% after the first year of implementation. Beginning in 2008, for 
elementary and middle schools the progress section measured the change in individual students’ 
performance with four indicators: 
•  Percentage of all students making at least one year of progress on state exams 
•  Percentage of students in the school’s lowest third making at least one year of progress on state 
exams 
•  Average change in proficiency for students scoring at level 1 or 2 in prior year 
•  Average change in proficiency for students scoring at level 3 or 4 in prior year CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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Instead of rewarding schools for attracting students who already performed well, the DOE hoped the 
heavy weight of this subsection would reward what schools brought to their students—in other words, 
giving schools credit for “adding value” to their students’ performance trajectory. In order to account for 
movement within a proficiency level, the DOE converted the state’s range of raw scores to a proficiency 
rating for ELA and math from third through eighth grades. Table 2 includes illustrative conversions for 
eighth grade ELA and math scores. 
Table 2: Conversion of New York state proficiency levels and raw scores to DOE proficiency ratings, 
2009 
Eighth Grade English Language Arts  Eighth Grade Math   
Level  Raw Score 
Proficiency 
Rating  Level  Raw Score 
Proficiency 
Rating 
 
4  715-795  4.00 – 4.50  4  701-800  4.00 – 4.50   
 3*  650-714   3.00 – 3.99   3*  650-700   3.00 – 3.99   
2  602-649  2.00 – 2.99  2  616-649   2.00 – 2.99   
1  430-601  1.00 – 1.99  1  470-615  1.00 – 1.99   
Note: *Level 3 is considered proficient for NCLB purposes 
Source: NYCDOE Office of Accountability 
For example, if a student started the school year with a proficiency rating of 2.25 and ended the year at 
2.50, the school would receive credit for the gain even though the student did not advance from level 2 
to level 3. On the flip side, a school would lose points if a student’s proficiency rating went down. If a 
student’s proficiency rating stayed the same from one year to the next, that was counted as making one 
year of progress. To account for student mobility within the city, a transfer student’s progress was split 
between the sending and receiving school in the year of the transfer, based on the time of year the state 
exams were administered. A student’s ELA progress was allocated 60% to the sending school and 40% to 
the receiving school, while math progress was allocated 40% to the sending school and 60% to the 
receiving school. 
For high schools, the student progress section was calculated based on how students performed relative 
to the probability they would pass or fail the Regents exams given their eighth-grade scores on state 
standardized tests. This section also scored the average pass rate for Regents exams and credit 
accumulation. Liebman included credit accumulation based on historical data that showed a strong 
correlation between the number of credits a student had in specific semesters (especially in ninth and 
tenth grades) and the probability of graduating on time. Student progress was calculated on a semester 
basis in order to account for mobility—the student’s progress was used to calculate the score of the 
school awarding credit in a particular semester. 
Closing the achievement gap 
The achievement gap section awarded additional credit to elementary and middle schools that raised 
proficiency levels by half a level or more for students in the lowest third of performance city-wide. The 
comparable section on the high school version gave additional credit to schools based on the number of 
students in the same group that attained at least a quarter of the credits needed to graduate in each of 
their first three years of high school.   CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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Overall grade 
In all but the additional credit subsection, schools received two scores: one showing how well the school 
performed in relation to all NYC public schools, and another demonstrating how the school performed 
relative to a group of 40 peer schools with comparable students. No school had the same 40 peer 
schools. To determine the overall grade, the city and peer comparisons for each subsection were 
weighted 25% and 75%, respectively, to derive a total subsection score (which was also converted into a 
subsection letter grade). The subsection scores were then summed for a total score on the 100-point 
scale. Any points from the additional credit subsection were then added and the resulting score was 
converted into a letter grade as shown in Table 2.
 (For a technical explanation of the calculation of each 
subsection and the overall grade, see the New York City Progress Report Educator Guide, available for 
elementary and middle schools as well as high schools on the DOE’s website.
24)  
Challenges: Fairness, Fit and Reliability 
The progress reports quickly became the primary vehicle for assessing and communicating school 
performance. Even as they were embraced around the city as an accountability tool, their 
implementation generated a number of challenges related to their fairness, fit with the state’s 
accountability system, and reliability. 
Questions of fairness 
Opening new schools was a major pillar of Klein’s improvement strategy, and the DOE opened hundreds 
between 2006 and 2009. New elementary and middle schools did not receive a progress report until 
they had two years of data and high schools did not receive them until their first cohort graduated. This 
meant that the new schools strategy went largely “ungraded” in the first years of the progress reports. 
In addition, various stakeholder groups asserted that the progress reports did not account for special 
situations well enough. The DOE eventually responded to these concerns by developing separate reports 
for schools serving only K–3 students in which only third graders took state exams, for schools serving 
only special-education students taking alternative assessments, and for high schools serving students 
who were at risk of “aging out” of the school system without graduating.  
Some school communities argued that they were disadvantaged in an evaluation system with a 60% 
weight on student growth because they already had high levels of student achievement. But the DOE 
leadership team was firm in its belief that schools should be rewarded for what they added to their 
students, and resisted calls to create a customized version of the report for the city’s perennially high 
performing schools. However, a new rule would go into effect in 2010 so that no school in the top 
quartile of the performance subsection citywide could receive a progress report grade below C 
regardless of their score on the progress subsection.  
Fit with state accountability system 
The DOE’s timeline for imposing consequences on underperforming schools was more aggressive than 
the state’s timeline, but the state evaluated schools on absolute performance, not growth rates. As a 
result, schools with low absolute performance and rapid growth rates received As and Bs on their DOE 
progress reports but showed up on the state’s watch list for underperforming schools. This mismatch 
contributed to public confusion about how to assess school quality.  CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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Another tension was related to the state’s annual decision about the cut scores used to define 
proficiency levels on the state exams. For instance, the state lowered the cut scores for each level in 
2009, making it much easier for students to reach the proficiency bar. Because of the heavy weight on 
year-over-year growth in the progress reports, 84% of schools received an A or B on that year, as shown 
in Table 3. The dramatic uptick in letter grades called into question the usefulness of the progress report 
in determining the real state of performance in the city’s schools.  
Table 3: Percentage of schools with each progress report grade, 2007–2009 
  A  B  C  D  F  No score 
2007 (n=1261)*  23%  39%  26%  8%  4%  n/a 
2008 (n=1493)  35%  37%  13%  4%  2%  9% 
2009 (n=1527)  68%  16%  5%  2%  <1%  8% 
*In 2007 the DOE did not include schools without scores in its progress report data file 
Source: Author analysis of publicly available progress report results for 2007, 2008, and 2009.
25  
By fall of 2009 when the scores were public, Shael Suransky had succeeded Jim Liebman as head of the 
accountability office. He posited that if the leadership team had been able to predict in September that 
such a large jump might occur, they might have raised their own cut scores even higher so that the letter 
grades would have been a more accurate reflection of the relative performance of schools.
26 However, 
he also noted that the DOE would have had to raise the cut scores more than a standard deviation from 
the year before, which would most likely have created questions about the fairness of the decision.
27  
Concerns about reliability 
Perhaps the most significant criticism came from measurement experts such as Harvard professor Dan 
Koretz, who pointed out that New York state exams were designed to provide a snapshot at a point in 
time, not as a way to track individual student growth from year to year.
28 Therefore, they were not 
appropriate for the task of measuring progress at the school level. Another criticism was that the 
unpredictability of changes in student scores from year to year suggested high levels of measurement 
error in the state exams, which accounted for 60% of the progress report grades in elementary and 
middle schools. High school reports were based on a more diverse set of measures and therefore were 
more stable.  
After years of analysis and discussion of this issue, as well as the concern that those schools with high 
absolute scores were disadvantaged in the scoring system, the DOE announced that for the 2010 school 
year it would discard the four indicators it used to calculate the progress subsection in favor of a growth 
percentile for every student. While maintaining that the four indicators used from 2007 to 2009 had 
created an appropriate incentive for schools to maximize the growth of every student, the DOE 
acknowledged that they did not fully account for the relationship between the performance and 
progress metrics. Going forward, the progress section would use only two indicators: the median growth 
percentile for all students and the median growth percentile for the bottom third of students on the 
prior year’s proficiency rating.  
The new method would account for the fact that low performing students were more likely to show one 
year of progress on state exams than high performing students whose absolute scores were already at 
the top of the range. The approach was modeled on a methodology developed by the state of Colorado 
and took into account students’ beginning proficiency levels when calculating their yearly progress for CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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state and federal accountability purposes. The underlying assumption was that growth percentiles 
would control for the probability that students would make one year of progress given their starting 
proficiency. The percentile would indicate what percentage of students had less growth than an 
individual student. For instance, a student who had a 3.0 proficiency rating on the fifth grade exams 
would be in the 35
th percentile if he or she maintained a 3.0 rating on the sixth grade exams. A student 
who maintained a 4.2 rating from year to year, however, would be in the 50
th percentile, because fewer 
students at that rating had historically made a year’s worth of progress the following year. In the past, 
these two students would have contributed the same amount to a school’s progress grade. In the new 
system, the student who began at a higher level would contribute more because of the higher percentile 
ranking.  
In July 2010, as we were writing this chapter, the state of New York released exam scores for the prior 
school year, which had been calculated based on a new, much higher cut score for proficiency. As a 
result, scores around the state dropped dramatically. New York City’s scores fell at a lower rate than the 
rest of the state, but nevertheless were a significant drop from 2009. Suransky and his team were 
recalibrating all scores back to 2006 based on the 2010 cut scores in order to create a better picture of 
what the growth rates had actually been over the years and were analyzing the implications the sudden 
change at the state level would have on progress report calculations.  
Quality Reviews  
The leadership team described the progress report as a lagging indicator because it provided a snapshot 
of how students performed relative to the year before and how schools scored relative to other schools 
in the city at a point in time. However, school teams needed different, timelier data that could serve as a 
leading indicator of how their students might perform in the future so that they could adjust their 
instructional approaches and management systems in order to continuously improve. For this task, the 
Office of Accountability designed a quality review process to communicate and reinforce a set of 
behaviors and practices it believed would drive improvements in student achievement.  
Beginning in the 2007 school year, every public school in New York City participated in an annual quality 
review (QR), modeled loosely on public school inspections in the U.K. and Hong Kong. Every school 
received a one- or two-day visit from an outside reviewer who observed staff meetings, examined 
documents, and asked teachers, parents, and the principal a series of questions about a number of the 
school’s practices.  
The Office of Accountability partnered with Cambridge Education, a United Kingdom-based school 
review firm, on the design and implementation of the QR protocols for three years. The rubric reviewers 
used to observe schools was focused primarily on the school’s use of data to adjust teaching practices in 
order to improve student outcomes. Liebman and his team created five overarching quality statements, 
each of which had seven indicators that guided reviewers’ observations: 
•  Gather Data: School leaders consistently gather and generate data and use it to understand 
what each student knows and can do, and to monitor students’ progress over time. 
•  Plan and Set Goals: School leaders and faculty consistently use data to understand each 
student’s next learning steps and to set suitably high goals for accelerating each student’s 
learning. CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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•  Align Instructional Strategy to Goals: The school aligns its academic work, strategic decisions, 
and resources—and effectively engages students—around its plans and goals for accelerating 
student learning. 
•  Align Capacity Building to Goals: The development of leadership, teachers and other staff 
capacity is aligned to the school’s collaboratively established goals for accelerating the learning 
of each student. 
•  Monitor and Revise: The school has structures for monitoring and evaluating each student’s 
progress throughout the year and for flexibly adapting plans and practices to meet its goals for 
accelerating learning. 
Because the rubric focused heavily on the process by which school teams used data to improve 
instruction, it reinforced other organizational learning tools that are not discussed in this paper. These 
include the periodic assessments that every student took five times a year to map their progress toward 
mastery of the state standards, as well as the teacher-led inquiry teams that were established to spread 
a culture of data use throughout the schools. Liebman explained the rationale behind a rubric focused 
on the use of data: 
I looked at all of the rubrics that are out there for school reviews and instructional walkthroughs. 
They all have one section on the use of data to drive strategy and facilitate frequent adjustment, 
and many other sections on inputs such as specific teaching practices and curricular materials. As I 
thought about what we are trying to accomplish, I realized that what we needed to change most 
was the emphasis in our schools from ‘teaching inputs’ to ‘learning outcomes.’ Until we instill a 
culture of data-driven instructional differentiation in our schools, I’m not as interested in the parts 
of these rubrics that are about inputs. Secondly, we are not pushing a particular educational 
philosophy or professional development strategy. The last thing we want to do is to convey the 
sense that we have an idea in our heads at the central office about what the ‘right’ answer is for 
each school.”  
Liebman sometimes described the rubric as a way to determine the degree to which schools were on 
the way to becoming “autonomous problem-solving units.” 
In spring 2006, the DOE worked with Cambridge Education to pilot the process in 100 schools, which led 
to modest changes to the rubric and review process based on feedback from principals and reviewers. 
For instance, the pilot used three rating categories: underdeveloped, proficient, and well developed. 
Pilot schools overwhelmingly scored in the middle category, but principals and reviewers reported that 
they had seen a wide range of practices within the category. As a result, the Office of Accountability 
expanded it to five rating categories:  
•  Underdeveloped 
•  Underdeveloped with proficient features 
•  Proficient 
•  Well developed  
•  Outstanding 
Before going through the quality review process, every principal went through approximately 40 hours 
of training on the process through a program called Children First Intensive (CFI) developed and run by CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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Irma Zardoya. CFI familiarized principals with the QR process, the five quality indicators and 35 sub-
indicators, and the associated team behaviors reviewers would look for during the QRs.  
Throughout the 2007 school year, Cambridge Education consultants performed all of the quality 
reviews, but a number of New York principals and administrators observed reviews so that they could 
conduct the process without consultants in the future. By June 2007, approximately 140 consultants had 
conducted school-quality reviews across more than 1,400 schools; at the end of 2008 they had 
conducted 2,900 reviews over the two years.  
The process was costly; the three-year Cambridge contract was $19 million
29 and schools spent an 
enormous amount of time prepping for QRs every year. Beginning in 2009, the DOE no longer reviewed 
every school annually. Schools that received an A or B on the progress report combined with a QR rating 
of proficient or better were only scheduled for review every third year as long they maintained or 
improved their letter grade. Schools with other grade and QR combinations remained on the annual 
cycle. In addition to freeing up time at the school level, the reduction in the number of schools reviewed 
annually meant that the DOE could accomplish all QRs with internal reviewers rather than expensive 
outside consultants. At the same time, the DOE made changes to some of the sub-indicators, tightening 
some general language to more concrete statements of behaviors. Because only the lowest performing 
schools now received QRs and they were conducted by insiders who were on the lookout for more 
specific behaviors, the process felt much more compliance oriented than the DOE intended. Suransky 
and his team were considering ways to counter this perception.  
Interactions between the QR and Progress Report 
The progress reports and quality reviews were independent tools; for instance, the quality review rating 
appeared on the progress report but was not used in the calculation of the school’s letter grade. 
However, Liebman and his team believed that viewed together they provided a picture of how the 
school had performed in the past and how it was likely to perform in the future. This could be useful in 
making decisions about positive and negative consequences for schools. Table 4 is a “consequences 
matrix” based on schools’ progress report grades and QR ratings. 
Table 4: Consequences matrix  
    Quality Review Rating 
   
Outstanding 
Well-
Developed  Proficient 
Underdeveloped 
w/ Proficient 
Features  Underdeveloped 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
 
G
r
a
d
e
  A 
Eligible for Rewards  No rewards or consequences 
B 
C 
No Rewards or consequences unless school receives C for three consecutive 
years, then treated as a D school 
D  Subject to academic planning and target 
setting by Office of Accountability. 
Multiple years of D or F grade and no 
improvement in QR rating could lead to 
leadership change or school closure 
   
F 
Possible leadership change or 
school closure 
Source: Internal NYCDOE documents and primary interviews CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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In practice, the matrix was not used as an absolute determinant of a school’s future, but rather helped 
identify schools for further attention from the chancellor and the accountability office. For example, a 
principal in a school that received both an F and an underdeveloped with proficient features rating was 
not automatically fired, but instead was flagged so that the senior team could examine other relevant 
information about the principal and school in order to make a decision about the school’s future.  
Plotting schools on the consequences matrix as in Table 5 provides an additional layer of information 
about how schools with various letter grades rated on their quality reviews. Eventually the DOE hoped 
to have enough data to determine whether the quality review was truly a predictor of future 
performance. 
Table 5: Numbers of schools at each position of the consequences matrix, 2009 
    Quality Review Rating 
   
Outstanding 
Well-
Developed  Proficient 
Underdeveloped 
w/ Proficient 
Features  Underdeveloped 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
 
G
r
a
d
e
  A  18  554  391  37  1 
B  0  105  116  13  2 
C   0   17    51   9   1 
D  0  1   17  3  5 
F  0  0  5  0  0 
Note: Includes data from the 1346 schools that had both a progress report grade and a quality review rating in the 2008-2009 
school year. All letter grades are from 2009; QR ratings are from 2008 and 2009, depending on the year of a school’s last QR.  
Source: Compiled from publicly available progress report results
30 
 
For instance, would the 18 C and D schools with “well-developed” QR ratings in Table 5 move into the A 
and B categories over the next few years? Would the three A and B schools with “underdeveloped” QR 
ratings receive a lower grade the following year? At the end of the 2009 school year, the tools were too 
new and had evolved too often to provide a valid link between the two measures.  
Though the locus of accountability and the responsibility for the behaviors assessed in the QR process 
fell squarely on the school principal, the DOE theory of action eventually included the assumption that 
teams of teachers would use the various data tools to learn more deeply about students and respond 
more effectively to their needs. As the theory of action continued to evolve, Klein and the senior team 
began to talk about the strategy as having three phases. The first phase—consolidation—began in 2002 
and was focused on the system. The second phase—the autonomy/accountability exchange—began in 
2006, and was focused on schools. In 2009, the team began to talk about a third phase that was focused 
on classrooms. In order for accountability for student performance and team-based problem solving to 
become sustainable features of the culture at all levels of the system, they had to become part of the 
everyday work of teachers in classrooms.   
TEACHER PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Pushing the unit of analysis to the classroom level raises the question of how teachers perceive the 
accountability and organizational learning cultures in their schools, both of which are critical aspects of 
the DOE performance management system. This section draws on a large-scale survey of New York City 
teacher perceptions and provides an early look at the DOE’s theory in action as reflected in teacher CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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perceptions of organizational learning and accountability at their schools. In particular, we explore the 
extent to which DOE schools do indeed fall out differently across these two dimensions of organizational 
learning and accountability, suggesting that differences in school cultures do exist and are worthy of 
further investigation. Second, we examine correlations between various indicators of performance and 
where schools fall on an organizational learning and accountability matrix. We stress that these are 
investigatory analyses; we offer several suggestions for future research at the end of this section to 
deepen our understanding of DOE’s theory in action in schools.  
The data we analyzed in this exploratory analysis comes from items we added to the DOE’s 2009 
Learning Environment Survey for teachers. This survey was launched in February of 2009 to 
approximately 80,000 teachers, of whom 58,000 teachers responded either on paper or online, 
reflecting a 73% response rate. Our data come from the 26,500 teachers who took the survey online, 
who make up 46% of the responding teachers. When we aggregate teacher responses to the school 
level in our analyses, we focus on non-special-education schools where at least 50% of teachers 
responded to a survey, and where at least half of these teachers responded to the survey online. This 
sample of majority-responding schools includes 19,500 teachers in 586 schools.  
Building on a pilot validation study conducted in another large urban district, we investigated the extent 
to which teachers felt “psychologically safe” in their schools. This measure was adapted from 
Edmondson for the present context and is one of the core components of the organizational learning 
building block, “supportive work environment,” previously discussed on page 11.
31 The “psychological 
safety” measure was composited from three items and added to the 2009 Learning Environment survey: 
•  In this school, it’s easy to speak up about what is on your mind. 
•  People in this school are eager to share information about what does and doesn’t work. 
•  People in this school are usually comfortable talking about problems and disagreements. 
Teachers responded to these items on a 4-point response scale that ranged from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. A principal components analysis (PCA) indicated that these three items are facets of a 
single construct.
32 We calculated the arithmetic mean of the items to produce a single value capturing 
each teacher’s sense of psychological safety in their school.  
The construct of “accountability” was composited from seven items on the teacher survey, four of which 
were existing measures on the Learning Environment Survey (first four below) and three of which were 
new items piloted in other schools prior to being added (remaining three). The items encapsulate many 
aspects of accountability covered in the literature by capturing teacher perceptions of both internal and 
external accountability, aspects of the accountability process, and outcomes that serve as accountability 
targets. Further, and consistent with O’Day’s notion of the “new accountability,” which places the school 
at the center of intervention and the teachers as the units for action, these items assessed teacher 
perceptions of their school (rather than their department or some other level of analysis):
33 
•  My school has high expectations for all students. 
•  Teachers in this school set high standards for student work in their classes. 
•  This school makes it a priority to help students find the best ways to achieve their learning goals. CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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•  My school has clear measures of progress for student achievement throughout the year. 
•  Our school is focused on improving performance on measures of student achievement for this 
year. 
•  Meeting targets for student progress is a priority in this school. 
•  Helping students reach targets for mastery of important skills and content is a priority for this 
school. 
Conceptually, these items tap into teachers’ perceptions of accountability for improving student 
learning. Together, they offer a new, robust representation of accountability because they cover both 
the processes and outcomes of accountability for achieving high-performance. This is consistent with 
many of the theories of action in education reform today, including NYC’s theory of action, which has 
shifted away from a singular emphasis on outputs to one that emphasizes both inputs (e.g., Quality 
Reviews) and outputs (e.g., performance and progress reports).  
Empirically, these items hold together as a single construct extremely well.
34 Therefore, as with the 
psychological safety items, we produced a single accountability value for each teacher by taking 
arithmetic means of the items.  
Our statistical analyses also show that psychological safety and accountability are correlated, but this 
association is not surprising—nor does it negate the theoretical distinction between the constructs.
35 
Both capture perceptions of school culture, which is why they are correlated, and yet they capture 
different aspects of that culture: psychological safety is about the conditions for adult learning, whereas 
accountability is about adults focusing on student learning. In fact, 140 schools in our sample were high 
on one measure but low on the other, suggesting that these two aspects of culture can exist 
independent of one another.  
We aggregated the psychological safety and accountability measures across teachers at each school and 
reverse-coded them to produce school-wide values for psychological safety and accountability such that 
higher values reflect a higher sense of psychological safety and accountability in a school. We used the 
medians of these school-aggregate measures as the dividing line between “high” and “low” values on 
each measure. The schools that we refer to as “high” on psychological safety and accountability, 
therefore, are the 223 schools that had values at or above 3.08 and 3.42 on each measure, respectively. 
The 223 schools that had values below these cut-off points on both measures constitute our pool of 
schools that are “low” on each measure. Figure 1 displays the variance that exists between schools 
regarding teacher perceptions of their school’s ability to balance organizational learning and 
accountability.  CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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Figure 1: School-level teacher responses regarding accountability/psychological safety (n=586) 
 
To investigate this further, we explored the off-diagonals of the matrix in Figure 1 to see if there were 
any apparent differences in performance between the two groups of schools, and we found that there 
were. As Table 6 below shows, schools with high accountability and high organizational learning 
environments outperform low accountability and low organizational learning environments along a 
number of performance indicators.
36 We again emphasize that these are preliminary analyses and note, 
for example, the difference in response rates across the categories. Still, these data do provide some 
early and suggestive evidence in support of the theory of action regarding the performance benefits 
associated with creating school cultures in which teachers feel both accountable and psychologically 
safe to invest in their own learning. 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for high psychological safety/high accountability and low psychological 
safety/low accountability schools  
        High/High  Low/Low    
Performance Measure  Min.  Max.  n  Mean(sd)  n  Mean (sd)  t-statistic 
2009 progress score   6.7  70  172  47.07 (9.1)  180  42.62 (10.4)  4.28*** 
2008 performance score  1.5  25  167  16.43 (.34)  177  14.05 (4.2)  5.14*** 
2009 performance score  7.2  25  172  19.65 (3.9)  180  17.64 (3.9)  4.86*** 
07-08 Quality Review   1  5  168  3.73 (.51)  189  3.44 (.64)  4.67*** 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001           
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CONCLUSION 
The DOE’s performance management system is a distinctive attempt to execute the high wire act of 
balancing support and pressure that scholars and practitioners have been writing and speaking about for 
the last decade. The DOE had an explicit theory of action for improving student outcomes—the 
autonomy/accountability exchange—and attempted to create organizational structures, systems, and 
culture that were coherent with this theory.
37 For the autonomy/accountability exchange to work at 
scale, schools had to develop the capacity for adult learning in order to create better learning outcomes 
for students, given that the central bureaucracy would no longer mandate particular curricular and 
instructional approaches. This is much more than a psychological contract between the central office 
and schools, however; expectations for performance are high and the consequences for not meeting the 
requirements of the accountability system are serious. Student performance in New York City, as 
measured by state exam scores and graduation rates, has accelerated since the evolving theory of action 
was put into practice, but the jury is still out on the specific contributors to that improvement. The 
state’s dramatic upward adjustment to cut scores for 2010 created massive drops in the percentage of 
students reaching proficiency and reignited the debate about just how much progress students in New 
York City have actually made during Klein’s tenure.  
Nevertheless, the approach to performance management, balancing accountability and organizational 
learning, is already being adopted by other districts. This historical analysis and preliminary empirical 
work suggest several promising areas for future research. First, we suggest that scholars investigate the 
ways in which different districts have approached the tensions explored in this paper. Though the DOE’s 
emphasis on the granting of autonomy in exchange for accountability regardless of schools’ prior 
performance is being adopted in other districts, most cities still require schools to earn expanded 
autonomy. As the demands for improving performance continue and impatience with the status quo 
increases, it will be interesting to watch how different districts develop and enact their theories of 
change. How will these theories of action fare and can we create some generalizable principles about 
what kinds of interventions “work” to produce the results desired? Do different theories of action 
require different approaches to performance management? Are districts increasingly trying to balance 
accountability and organizational learning, and if so, do their attempts differ based on their particular 
theories of action? Investigations of these topics would add greatly to research and practice.  
We can also ask, how do these systems impact school culture and what effect does this have on 
performance? Often, discussions of culture in the education sector are either amorphous (“schools need 
strong cultures”) or descriptive (i.e., long lists of general characteristics such as “collaboration”). If we 
can identify and more clearly define specific dimensions of school culture (such as accountability and 
psychological safety) that “matter” in the daily practice of teachers and are predictive of improvements 
in learning outcomes of students, then we would be better positioned to find points of entry to effect 
change. If subsequent analyses do support the preliminary findings offered here, and we expect they 
will, then the next logical question to ask is “why?” Why is it that some schools are able to achieve a 
desirable balance between organizational learning factors such as psychological safety and a sense of 
accountability? Qualitative data are needed to answer this question and would complement the large-
scale survey work that is currently underway in DOE and could provide insight into effects observed. 
We hope that the chapters in this volume, including our description of and investigation into the DOE’s 
performance management system and the theories that underlie it, will provide scholars and 
practitioners with a point of reference for considering their own efforts to cultivate high-performing 
systems of schools. CONFERENCE DRAFT 
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